我是鮑勃．科林吉里，16年前，我拍攝電視節目「書呆子的勝利」時，我採訪了史帝夫．賈伯斯，時間是在1995年。在那10年前，賈伯斯離開蘋果，他與執行長史卡利發生激烈衝突；史卡利還是他親自找進公司的。訪問當時，賈伯斯在經營NeXT電腦，創立於他離開蘋果之後。當時沒人料到，18個月後，他會將NeXT賣給蘋果；再6個月後，他會重掌大權。由於電視製作的關係，節目中只用到部份訪問，多年來我們以為訪問內容已遺失，母帶從倫敦運送美國途中失蹤。不久前，節目導播保羅．森，在自家車庫發現訪問的拷貝影帶。
I’m Bob Cringely. 16 years ago when I was making my television series Triumph of the Nerds I interviewed Steve Jobs. That was in 1995. Ten years earlier Steve had left Apple following a bruising struggle with John Sculley, the CEO he’d bought into the company. At the time of our interview Steve was running NeXT, the niche computer company he founded after leaving Apple. Little did we know that within 18 months he would sell NeXT to Apple and six months later he’d be running the place. The way things work in television we used only a part of that interview in the series and for years we thought the interview was lost forever because the master tape went missing while being shipped from London to the US in the 1990s. Then just a few days ago series director Paul Sen found a VHS copy of that interview in his garage.
賈伯斯極少接受電視訪問，更幾乎沒有完整的訪問，這次訪問罕見地呈現出賈伯斯的領袖魅力、直率和遠見。為了紀念這位卓越非凡的人物，我們在此重現該次訪問全貌，其中大多數畫面均係首次曝光。
There are very few TV interviews with Steve Jobs, and almost no good ones. They rarely show the charisma, candour and vision that this interview does. And so, to honour an amazing man, here is that interview in its entirety. Most of this has never been seen before.
電腦科技的啟蒙
你當初怎會投身個人電腦？
So how did you get involved with personal computers?
我第一次接觸電腦是10、11歲，當年的事情很難回想起來，我現在已經老了，所以10、11歲大約是30年前。當時沒人看過電腦，根本沒機會看到，他們只在電影中看過那些轟隆隆運轉的大箱子，人們莫名地對磁帶機感到著迷，那彷彿便是電腦的象徵，還會閃爍著燈光，所以沒有人真的見過。電腦很神祕，強大運算能力默默進行，能親眼看到並實際使用在當時極不容易。我是去美國太空總署，他們的艾姆斯研究中心，我使用的是分時終端機，因此看到的並非真的電腦，而是分時終端機。很難想起當時機器有多麼原始，電腦根本沒有圖像顯示，那實際上是印表機，是有鍵盤的電傳打字印表機。你可以鍵入指令，等一會兒後，機器會開始運作，然後告訴你答案。但即便如此還是很了不起，尤其是在十歲小孩眼裡。你可以用BASIC或Fortran寫程式，然後這台機器會接收你的想法，將之執行，再把結果交給你。假如結果一如預測，你的程式就奏效了，這真的是令人興奮不已的經驗。所以我變得…對電腦非常著迷，而電腦對我而言仍有點神祕，因為它在線路的另一端，我並未真正見過實際的電腦本身。之後我有機會參觀電腦，看到其內部組成，然後我加入惠普的一個團體。
Hmm well I ran into my first computer when I was about ten or 11. And it’s hard to remember back then but I’m an old fossil now, I’m an old fossil, so when I was ten or 11 was about 30 years ago and no one had ever seen a computer. To the extent that they’d seen them. They’d seen them in movies and they were these big boxes with whirring. For some reason they fixated on the tape drives as being the icon of what the computer was or flashing lights somehow. And so nobody had ever seen one. They were very mysterious. Very powerful things that did something in the background. And so to see one and actually get to use one was a real privilege back then and I got into NASA, the Ames Research Centre down here, and I got to use a time sharing terminal so I didn’t actually see the computer but I saw a time sharing terminal. And in those days again it’s hard to remember how primitive it was. There was no such thing as a computer with a graphics video display. It was literally a printer. It was a Teletype printer with a keyboard on it and so you would keyboard these commands in and then you would wait for a while and then the thing would go [MAKING NOISES] and it would tell you something out. But even with that it was still remarkable, especially for a ten year old, that you could write a programme in BASIC let’s say or Fortran and actually this machine would sort of take your idea and it would it would sort of execute your idea and give you back some results. And if they were the results that you predicted your programme really worked. It was an incredibly thrilling experience. So I became very … captivated by a computer and a computer to me was still a little mysterious because it was at the other end of this wire and I’d never really seen the actual computer itself. And then I got tours of computers after that and saw the insides. And then I was part of this group at Hewlett Packard.
與惠普結緣
我12歲時致電惠普的比爾．休利特，這又透露出我年齡來了。當時電話簿上沒有隱藏的號碼，所以我打開電話簿查他的名字，他接電話時我說：「嗨，我叫史帝夫．賈伯斯，你不認識我，我今年12歲，我在製作頻率計數器，需要一些零件。」他就這樣跟我談了20分鐘，我有生之年不會忘記這件事，他不只給我零件還給我工作，那年夏天12歲的我在惠普工作，對我影響很大。
When I was 12 I called up Bill Hewlett who lived in Hewlett Packard at the time and, again this dates me, but there was no such thing as an unlisted telephone number then so I could just look in the book and look his name up. And he answered the phone and I said “Hi, my name’s Steve Jobs, you don’t know me but I’m 12 years old and I’m building a frequency counter and I’d like some spare parts.” And so he talked to me for about 20 minutes. I’ll never forget it as long as I live and he gave me the parts but he also gave me a job working in Hewlett Packard that summer, I was 12 years old. And that really made a remarkable influence on me.
惠普是當時我唯一看過的公司，形塑了我對公司的概念，也讓我體認他們如何照顧員工。當時大家還不曉得膽固醇的害處，他們每天早上十點，準備一推車的甜甜圈和咖啡，每個人都邊休息邊吃甜甜圈配咖啡。都是像這樣的小事，顯現該公司體認到，公司真正價值在於其員工。
Hewlett Packard was really the only company I’d ever seen in my life at that age and t formed my view of what a company and how well they treated their employees you know. At that time I mean they didn’t know about cholesterol back then but at that time they used to bring a big cart of doughnuts and coffee out at ten o’clock every morning. Everybody would take a coffee and doughnut break. So little things like that. It was clear that the company was the company recognised that its true value was its employees.
史上第一台個人電腦
總之惠普的事情就這樣成局，我們一小組人開始每週二晚間，去他們帕拉阿圖的實驗室，與那裡的研究員會面。我見到史上第一台桌上型電腦即惠普9100，大小跟手提箱差不多，擁有一個小型映像管顯示器，功能完備整齊，沒有其他外接配件。我對它一見鍾情，你可以用BASIC和APL寫程式，我會搭好幾小時的車，就為了去惠普摸那台機器，並為它寫程式，一切就這樣開始。
So anyway things led to things with Hewlett Packard and I started going up to their Palo Alto research labs every Tuesday night with a small group of people to meet some of their researchers and stuff and I saw the first desktop computer ever made which was the Hewlett Packard 9100. It was about as big as a suitcase but it actually had a small cathode ray tube display in it and it was completely self contained. There was no wire going off behind the curtain somewhere. And I fell in love with it and you could programme it in BASIC and APL and I would just for hours you know get a ride up to Hewlett Packard and hang around that machine and write programmes for it. And so that was the early days.
遇見Woz
當時我也認識了沃茲尼亞克，也許早一點，在14、15歲時遇見他。我們一拍即合，他是我認識第一個比我懂電子的人。我很喜歡他，他大概大我5歲，他已經上了大學，結果因為搗蛋被退學，所以和爸媽住在一起，就讀當地的德安薩社區學院。我們變成好朋友，一起做計畫。我們在君子雜誌上讀到有個叫狂奇船長的傢伙，據說他可以打免費電話，你一定也聽說過。我們又被這個給迷住了，怎麼有人做得到這種事？我們覺得這一定是唬爛，便開始在各處圖書館東翻西找，尋找那個免費發話的祕密音調。有一晚在史丹佛線性加速器中心，在技術資料圖書室最不起眼的一區，角落裡的最後一個書架上，我們找到一本AT&T的技術期刊，上面把原理講得一清二楚，那也是我永遠不會忘記的一刻。看到那份期刊，我們才恍然大悟，便開始製造發出那種音調的裝置。它運作的原理是，你知道打長途電話時，會聽到背景發出嘟嚕的聲音，聽起來像撥電話的按鍵聲，但是不同頻率，所以你無法複製。原來這是從一個電話電腦發給網路控制電腦的信號，AT&T設計原本的數位電話網路時，犯了一個致命的錯誤。他們把電腦互通訊息的信號，放在跟人聲同樣的頻段，這意味假如你能發出相同的信號，你可以透過話機輸入，整個AT&T國際電話網路，會認為你是AT&T的電腦。大約三週後，我們終於成功做出有效的裝置，我記得第一通電話是撥到洛杉磯沃茲尼亞克住帕薩迪納的親戚。我們撥錯了號碼，半夜裡把一個傢伙吵醒，我們對他大喊：「你不懂這通電話是免費的嗎？」那個人完全不買單。
And I met Steve Wozniak around that time too. Maybe a little earlier when I was around 14-15 years old. And we immediately hit it off. He was the first person that I’d met who knew more about electronics than I did and so I was. I liked him a lot and he was maybe five years older than I. He’d gone off to college and gotten kicked out for pulling pranks and was living with his parents and going to Deanza, the local junior college. So we became fast friends and doing projects together and we read about… we read about the story in Esquire magazine about this guy names Captain Crunch who could supposedly make free telephone calls. You’ve heard about this I’m sure. And er we again we were captivated. How could anybody do this? And we thought it must be a hoax. And we started looking through the libraries looking for the secret tones that would allow you to do this. And it turned out we were at Stanford Linear Accelerator Centre one night and way in the bowels of their technical library, way down at the last bookshelf in the corner bottom rack we found an AT&T technical journal that laid out the whole thing. And that’s another moment I’ll never forget. We saw this journal and we thought my god it’s all real. And so we set out to build a device to make these tones. And the way it worked was, you know when you make a long distance call you used to hear [MAKING NOISES] right in the background? They were tones that sounded like the touch tone you could make on your phone but they were different frequency so you couldn’t make them. It turned out that that was the signal from one telephone computer to another controlling the computers in the network and AT&T made a fatal flaw when they designed the original telephone network, digital telephone network, was they put the signalling from computer to computer in the same band as your voice which meant that if you could make those same signals you could put it right in through the handset and literally the entire AT&T international phone network would think you were an AT&T computer. And some after three weeks we finally built a box like this that worked. And I remember the first call we made was down to LA, one of Woz’s relatives down in Pasadena. We dialled the wrong number but we woke some guy up in the middle of the night and we were yelling at him like don’t you understand we made this call for free and this person didn’t appreciate that.
駭客經歷
但那實在很神奇，我們製作了這些小盒子，這種裝置被稱為「藍盒子」，我們在底部貼上紙條，我們的標語是「一手掌握全世界」。它們很成功，我們做出全世界最好的藍盒子，它全部是數位的，不需要調整。你可以利用公共電話，透過網路主幹到東岸城市，然後接衛星到歐洲再到土耳其，然後經由電纜折回亞特蘭大。你可以到達世界各地，你可以環遊世界五、六次，因為我們學會如何連接衛星。你可以打給隔壁的公共電話，然後對著話機大喊，一分鐘後聲音會出現在隔壁電話裡，就是這麼神奇。你可能會問，這哪裡有趣了？有趣的是我們很年輕，我們學到自己動手做東西，能控制數十億美元設備的裝置。我們學到就憑我們兩個人，你知道我們懂得不多，我們可以做出一個小東西，來控制一個巨大的東西，這是無比寶貴的經驗。假如沒有這個藍盒子，我不認為會有蘋果電腦的存在。
But it was it was miraculous and we built these little boxes to do blue boxing as it was called and we put a little note in the bottom of them. Our logo was “he’s got the whole world in his hands.” And they worked. We built the best blue box in the world. It was all digital. No adjustments and so you could go up to a pay phone and you could take a trunk over to White Plains and then take a satellite over to Europe and then go to Turkey, take a cable back to Atlanta. You know and you could go around the world. You could go round the world five or six times cause we learned all the codes for how to get on the satellites and stuff. And then you could call the pay phone next door and so you could shout in the phone and after about a minute it would come out the other phone. It was it was miraculous. And you might ask well what’s so interesting about that? What’s so interesting is that we were young. And what we learned was that we could build something ourselves that could control billions dollars worth of infrastructure in the world. That was what we learned was that us two, you know we didn’t know much. We could build a little thing that could control a giant thing. And that was an incredible lesson. I don’t think there would have ever been an Apple computer had there not been blue boxing.
沃茲尼亞克說你曾撥給教宗？
Woz said you called the Pope?
我們的確有撥給教宗，他假裝自己是季辛吉。我們找到梵蒂岡的電話，然後撥電話給教宗，結果把教廷上上下下都鬧醒了，我根本不曉得樞機主教是什麼，結果真的有人去喚醒教宗時，我們忍不住大笑，他們才意識到我們不是季辛吉。我們沒跟教宗講到話，但整件事實在很有趣。
Yeah we did call the Pope. He … he pretended to be Henry Kissinger and we got the number of the Vatican and we called the Pope and they started waking people up in the hierarchy you know. I don’t know cardinals and this and that. And they actually sent someone to wake up the Pope when finally we burst out laughing and they realised that we weren’t Henry Kissinger. Yeah. So we never got to talk to the Pope but it was very funny.
蘋果一號的偶然
是什麼讓你們從藍盒子，轉到個人電腦？
So the jump from blue boxes to personal computers what sparked that?
需要使然。既然有分時電腦，當時山景市有間分時電腦公司，我們可以租到一些時段，但我們需要一個終端機，而我們負擔不起，於是我們動手做了一個。這是我們做的第一個東西，我們製造了一個終端機，Apple I便源自這個終端機，只是後端加上微處理器，其實就是如此，把兩個獨立的東西合一。我們先製作終端機，然後完成Apple I。其實我們是為自已做的，因為我們什麼都買不起，我們便到處搜刮零件，然後親手組裝，一個要花40到80小時，然後總是容易壞，因為有很多細小的線路。結果我們很多朋友也想自己做，雖然他們能找到大部分的零件，但他們沒有那種技能。這種技能是我們從做中學來的，因此最後我們幫他們組電腦，這真的很花我們的時間。我們就想假如能做出印刷電路板，就是兩端是銅的玻璃纖維板，用蝕刻的方式做出電路來，那就能用來製作電腦，這樣就不用花上40小時，幾小時就能做出一台Apple I。
Well … necessity er in the sense that there was time sharing computers available and there was a time sharing company in Mountain View that we could get free time on. So but we needed a terminal and we couldn’t afford one. So we designed and built one. And that was the first thing we ever did. We built this terminal. And so what an Apple One was really an extension of this terminal putting a microprocessor on the back end. That’s what it was. It was really kind of two separate projects put together. So first we built the terminal and then we built the Apple One. And we, we really built it for ourselves because we couldn’t afford to buy anything and we’d scavenge parts here and there and stuff and we’d build these all by hand. I mean they’d take you know 40 to 80 hours to build one and then they’d always be breaking coz there’s all these tiny little wires. And so it turned out a lot of our friends wanted to build them too. And although they could scavenge most of the parts as well they didn’t have the sort of skills to build them that we had acquired by training ourselves through building them and so we ended up helping them build most of their computers and it was really taking up all of our time and we thought you know if we could make what’s called a printed circuit board which is a piece of fibreglass with copper on both sides that’s etched to form the wires so that you could build a computer. You know you could build an Apple One in a few hours instead of 40 hours.
開始作電腦生意
有了電路板的話，我們可以用成本價賣給朋友，這樣就能把錢賺回來，不只皆大歡喜，我們也有了人生方向，於是我們就那樣做了。我賣掉自己的福斯旅行車，沃茲尼亞克賣掉自己的計算機，這樣便有足夠的錢支付朋友，請他幫我們設計印刷電路板。我們做了一些印刷電路板，賣了一些給朋友。我本來想賣掉剩下的貨，這樣就能贖回我們的車和計算機，結果我走進世界第一家電腦商店，山景市的「位元商店」，好像是在埃爾卡米諾街上，幾年後轉手成了成人書店，當時是「位元商店」。當時的老闆，名字應該是保羅．泰瑞爾，他說：「我買50個。」我想太棒了，但他說：「我要組裝好的。」之前我們從來沒想到這一點，因此我們盤算一下，心想有何不可？為什麼不試試看？所以接下來幾天裡，我打電話聯絡電子零件經銷商，我們還搞不清自己在做什麼，就點名我們需要的零件。我們估計買100套零件，組出50台來，以成本兩倍價錢賣給「位元商店」，收入足夠支付100組的錢，我們自己還剩下50組，賣掉就能賺錢了。於是我們說服經銷商，讓我們賒帳30天，我們根本不曉得那是什麼意思，就這樣簽字了。我們可以30天後付款，於是我們買了零件，我們把產品做出來，50台賣給帕拉阿圖的「位元商店」，29天內我們拿到錢，30天內把經銷商的帳付清。我們就這樣開始做起生意，但我們碰到典型的變現危機，我們的利潤都不是現金，是50台堆在角落的電腦。因此突然之間我們不得不想，如何將利潤變現？於是我們開始思考經銷的問題，還有其他賣電腦的店嗎？我們開始聯絡全美我們知道的電腦賣場，我們就這樣開始做生意。
If we could if we only had one of those we could sell them to all our friends for you know as much as it cost us to make them and make our money back and everybody would be happy and we’d say you know we’d get a life again. So we did that. I sold my Volkswagen bus and Steve sold his calculator and we got enough money to pay a friend of ours to make the artwork to make a printed circuit board. And we made some printed circuit boards and we sold some to our friends and I was trying to sell the rest of them so that we could get our Microbus and calculator back and I walked into the first computer store in the world which was the Byte Shop of Mountain View I think on El Camino er… it metamorphized into an adult bookstore a few years later. But at this point it was the Byte shop. And the person that ran I guess I think his name was Paul Tyrell he said you know “I’ll take 50 of those.” I said this is great. But he said “I want them fully assembled.” We’d never thought of this before. So we then er kicked this around and we thought why not? Why not try this? And so I spent the next several days on the phone talking with electronics parts distributors. We didn’t know what we were doing. And we said look here’s the parts we need. We need. We figured we’d buy 100 sets of parts. Build 50. Sell them to the Byte Shop for twice what it cost us to build them and therefore paying for the whole 100 and then we’d have 50 left and we could make our profit by selling those. So we convinced these distributors to give us the parts on net 30 days credit. We had no idea what that meant. Net. Sure, sign here. And so we had 30 days to pay them and so we bought the parts. We built the products and we sold 50 of them to the Byte shop in Palo Alto and got paid in 29 days and then went off and paid the parts people in 30 days and so we were in business. But we had the classic Marxian profit realisation crisis in that our profit wasn’t in a liquid currency. Our profit was in 50 computers sitting in the corner. So then all of a sudden we had to think wow how are we going to realise our profit. And so we started thinking about distribution. Are there any other computer stores? And we started calling the other computer stores that we’d heard of across the country and we just kind of eased into business that way.
蘋果二號奠定基石
蘋果創業的第三號關鍵人物是英特爾前主管邁克．馬庫拉，我問賈伯斯他怎會加入公司。
The third key figure in the creation of Apple was former Intel executive Mike Markkula. I asked Steve how he came aboard.
我們當時在設計Apple II，我們對Apple II的期望比較高。沃茲尼亞克想添加彩色圖形，我的期望則很清楚。雖然硬體愛好者能自己組裝電腦，或拿我們的電路板加上變壓器，然後再加上外殼和鍵盤，剩下的東西都能自己來，這樣的人是千中選一。但很多人還是想玩程式設計，他們鍾情軟體，就像我10歲初次碰電腦時一樣。因此我設想Apple II成為第一台預先組裝的電腦，給非硬體專家的個人電腦。結合了這兩個夢想，我們開始設計產品。我找到一個設計師，我們設計了包裝和一切，我們想用塑料做外型，一切準備萬全，但我們需要錢來開模，要花幾十萬美元。這超出了我們的能耐，於是我去找創投資金。我碰到一位叫瓦倫坦的創投金主，他到我們的車庫來，後來他說我像離經叛道之徒，這可是他的名言，他說他打算投資我們，但他推薦了幾個可能人選，其中之一是邁克．馬庫拉，於是我電邀他過來看看。邁克30、31歲就從英特爾退休，他在那裡是產品經理，最後配到股票賺了百萬美金，這在當時是很大一筆錢，他還投資石油和天然氣交易，待在家裡操盤。我覺得他渴望重回戰場，邁克和我一拍即合。邁克說幾週後就投資我們，而我說不，我們不要你的錢，我們要你。我們說服邁克加入成為合夥人，於是邁克不只出錢，自己也下海，我們三個攜手合作，結果產品就是Apple II，幾個月後在西岸電腦展推出。
We were designing the Apple Two and we had some much higher ambitions for the Apple II. Woz’s ambition was he wanted to add colour graphics. My ambition was that it was very clear to me that while there were a bunch of hardware hobbyists that could assemble their own computers or at least take our board and add the transformers for the power supply and the case and the keyboard etc and go get the rest of the stuff. For every one of those there were a 1000 people that couldn’t do that but wanted to mess around with programming. Software hobbyists. Just like I had been when I was you know ten discovering that computer. And so my dream for the Apple II was to sell the first real packaged computer. Packaged personal case and the keyboard etc and go get the rest of the stuff. For every one of those there were a 1000 people that couldn’t do that but wanted to mess around with programming. Software hobbyists. Just like I had been when I was you know ten discovering that computer. And so my dream for the Apple II was to sell the first real packaged computer. Packaged personal computer where you didn’t have to be a hardware hobbyist at all. And so combining both those dreams we actually designed the product and I found a designer and we designed the packaging and everything and we wanted to make it out of plastic and we had the whole thing ready to go but we needed some money for tooling the case and things like that. We needed a few hundred thousand dollars. And this was way beyond our means so I went looking for some venture capital. And I ran across one venture capitalist named Don Valentine who came over to the garage and he later said I looked like a renegade from the human race. That was his famous quote. And he said he wasn’t willing to invest in us but he recommended a few people that might and one of them was Mike Markkula. So I called Mike on the phone and Mike came over and Mike had retired at 30 or 31 from Intel. He was a product manager there and gotten a little bit of stock and made like a million bucks on stock options which at that time was quite a lot of money. And he’d been investing in oil and gas deals and staying home and doing that sort of thing. And he, I think, was kind of antsy to get back into something and Mike and I hit it off very well. And so Mike said OK I’ll invest after a few weeks and I said no. No we don’t want your money we want you. So we convinced Mike to actually throw in with us as an equal partner and so Mike put in some money and Mike put in himself and the three of us went off and we took this design that was virtually done with the Apple II and tooled it up and announced it a few months later at the West Coast Computer Faire.
蘋果二號初登板
結果如何呢？
What was that like?
很棒，我們銷售第一。西岸電腦展當時很小，但對我們來說夠大了。我們弄了一個很眩的展台，用投影電視展示Apple II，它的圖像界面今天看起來很粗糙，但當時是個人電腦中最先進的。我記得我們搶盡風頭，代理和經銷商蜂擁而至，我們就這樣上路了。
It was great. We got the best. I mean the West Coast Computer Faire was small at that time but to us it was very large. And so we had this fantastic booth there. We had a projection television showing the Apple II and showing its graphics which today look very crude but at that time were by far the most advanced graphics on a personal computer. And I think you know my recollection is we stole the show and a lot of dealers and distributors started lining up and we were off and running.
當時你幾歲？
How old were you?
21歲。
21.
創業、管理自學自通
21歲，你就很成功了。你等於是憑自己的天分做到的，你並無這方面特別的訓練。你怎樣學習經營公司的？
21. You’re a big success. You know you’ve just sort of done it by the seat of your pants. You don’t have any particular training in this. How do you learn to run a company?
在業界打滾這麼多年我發現，我常問別人，你為什麼做某些事？得到的答案都是，事情就是這樣。沒有人知道他們為什麼這樣做。生意上沒有人把事情想透徹，這就是我的體認。我給你一個例子，我們在車庫裡做Apple I時，我們很清楚知道成本在哪裡，當我們進入工廠量產Apple II時，會計會有標準成本的概念。你設下標準成本後，一季結束時會針對差異進行調整。我一直在問為什麼這樣做，答案是，就是得這樣做。研究了半年之後，我瞭解這樣做的原因，是因為你沒辦法真正掌控成本，只好用猜的，然後季末再調整。你不知道成本多少的原因，因為你的資訊系統不夠好，但這件事沒有人說破。之後設計麥金塔的自動化工廠時，我們擺脫了許多這種過時觀念，嚴格地掌控成本，做生意很多事情都是約定俗成，會那樣做只是因為以前那樣做，更久之前也一樣。因此如果你願意問問題，仔細思考，認真努力，你很快就能學會做生意，這不是多難的事情。
… You know throughout the years in business I found something which was I’d always ask why you do things and the answers you invariably get is oh that’s just the way its done. Nobody knows why they do what they do. Nobody thinks about things very deeply in business. That’s what I found. I’ll give you an example. When we were building our Apple Ones in the garage we knew exactly what they cost. When we got into a factory in the Apple II days the accounting had this notion of a standard cost. Where you’d kind of set a standard cost and at the end of a quarter you’d adjust it with a variance. And I kept asking well why do we do this? And the answer was well that’s just the way it’s done. And after about six months of digging into this what I realised was the reason you do it is because you don’t really have good enough controls to know how much it cost, so you guess and then you fix your guess at the end of the quarter, and the reason you don’t know how much it costs is because your information systems aren’t good enough. But nobody said it that way. And so later on when we designed this automated factory for Macintosh we were able to get rid of a lot of these antiquated concepts and know exactly what something cost to the second. So in business a lot of things are I call it folklore. They’re done because they were done yesterday. And the day before. And so what that means is if you’re willing to ask a lot of questions and think about things and work really hard you can learn business pretty fast. It’s not the hardest thing in the world.
不是火箭科學。
It’s not rocket science.
不是火箭科學。
It’s not rocket science, no.
你第一次接觸到電腦，在發明它們或之前的惠普9100時，你提到寫程式的事。那是什麼樣的程式？人們用這些程式來做什麼？
Now when you were first coming in contact with these computers. Inventing them and before that working on the HP 9100 you talk about writing programmes. What sort of programmes? What did people actually do with these things?
我們用來做什麼…我說個簡單的例子。我們在設計藍盒子時，寫了很多定制程式來幫助設計，這為我們省了很多功夫。比方說用子除數計算主頻率，來獲取其他頻率之類的。我們常會用到電腦，計算頻率會出現多少錯誤，多少範圍可以容忍。
Hmm … see what we did with them … well I’ll give you a simple example. When we were designing our blue box we wrote a lot of custom programmes to help us design it. You know and to do a lot of the dog work for us in terms of calculating master frequencies with sub divisors to get other frequencies and things like that. We used the computer quite a bit. And to calculate you know how much error we could get in the frequencies and how much could be tolerated.
你我決定電腦是什麼
所以我們在工作上會用到電腦。但更重要的是，這與是否拿它來做實際運用無關，而是用它來模擬你的思維過程，實際上是學習如何思考。我覺得學習是最大價值所在。我覺得人人都應該學習電腦程式，學習電腦語言能教會你如何思考，這就像去唸法學院一樣，我不覺得大家都應該當律師，但我覺得上法學院是有用的，因為它會教導你思考的方式，一如程式設計教你不同的思考方式。所以我把電腦科學視為人文學科，大家都應該要學習，一生中花一年時間來學，課程之一便是學習程式設計。
So we used them in our work but much more importantly it had nothing to do with using them for anything practical. It had to do with using them to be a mirror of your thought process. To actually learn how to think. I think the greatest value of learning. I think everybody in this country should learn how to programme a computer. Should learn a computer language because it teaches you how to think. It’s like going to law school. I don’t think anybody should be a lawyer but I think actually going to law school would be useful coz it teaches you how to think in a certain way. in the same way that computer programming teaches you in a slightly different way how to think. And so I view computer science as a liberal art. It should be something that everybody learns. You know takes a year in their life. One of the courses they take is you know learning how to programme.
我學過APL，很顯然我因此人生走歪了。
I learned APL which you know obviously is part of the reason why I’m going through life sideways.
如今你會覺得那是好的經驗，教會你以不同方式思考嗎？
You look back and consider it an enriching experience that taught you to think in a different way or not?
不，不能這樣說。其他程式語言或許如此，但我一開始就學APL。我要說Apple II顯然很成功。超級成功。
No. Not that particularly. Other languages perhaps more so but I started with APL. So I mean obviously the Apple II was a terrific success. Just incredibly so.
最重要的是公司、是人，不是錢
公司也巨幅成長，最後還上市。你們變得非常富有，發財是什麼感覺？
And the company grew like Topsy and eventually went public and you guys got really rich. What’s it like to get rich?
非常有趣。我身價超過一百萬美元時才23歲，24歲超過千萬美元，25歲就超過億萬美元，但那沒那麼重要，因為我從來就不是為了錢。我認為錢是很棒的東西，因為它讓你能做很多事，你可以投入短期無法回收的想法。但當時在我生命中，賺錢不是最重要的事情。最重要的是公司、是人，是我們製作的產品，以及產品對人們帶來的幫助。所以我不常把錢放在心上。你知道我沒賣掉一張股票。我真的相信公司長期會很有發展。
It’s very interesting. I was worth … about over a million dollars when I was 23. And over ten million dollars when I was 24 and over 100 million dollars when I was 25. And it wasn’t that important because I never did it for the money. I … I think money is a wonderful thing because it enables you to do things. It enables you to invest in ideas that don’t have a short term payback and things like that. But especially at that point in my life it was not the most important thing. The most important thing was the company, the people, the products we were making, what we were gonna enable people to do with these products so I didn’t think about it a great deal. You know I never sold any stock. Just really believed that the company would do very well over the long term.
全錄帕羅奧多研究中心的前瞻研究，對個人電腦的發展極為關鍵。賈伯斯最初於1979年造訪此地。
Central to the development of the personal computer was the pioneering work being done at Xerox Palo Alto Research Centre which Steve first visited in 1979.
有幾個人不停跟我說，要我去帕羅奧多研究中心，看看他們在做什麼。
I had three or four people who kept bugging that I ought to get my rear over to Xerox PARC and see what they were doing and so I finally did.
PARC大開視野，看到未來
最後我做了，我去了那裡。他們很親切，帶我看他們的研究，他們讓我看了三個東西，但第一個就讓我目瞪口呆，我甚至沒看清楚另外兩個。其中之一是物件導向程式設計，他們給我看那個，但我根本沒看到，另外讓我看的還有網路電腦系統。他們把100多台奧多電腦連成網路，還使用電子郵件等等，這我也沒看在眼裡。我看到的第一個東西就讓我傻了，那就是圖形使用者界面，那是這輩子我看到最棒的東西，不過缺點還很多，我們看到的還不完整，很多東西他們都弄錯了，但當時我們還不知道，雖然如此他們已有了雛形，而且做得很好。才10分鐘我就很清楚，有一天所有的電腦都會像這樣。這一點很明顯。你可以質疑這要花上幾年時間，你可以質疑誰會受益，但你不能否定其必然性，事情就是如此明白，你在那裡的話也會有同樣感覺。
I went over there. And they were very kind and they showed me what they were working on and they showed me really three things. But I was so blinded by the first one that I didn’t even really see the other two. One of the things they showed me was object oriented programming. They showed me that. But I didn’t even see that. The other one they showed me was really a network computer system. They had over 100 Alto computers all networked using email etc, etc. I didn’t even see that. I was so blinded by the first thing they showed me which was the graphic user interface. I thought it was the best thing I’d ever seen in my life. Now remember it was very flawed. What we saw was incomplete. They’d done a bunch of things wrong. But we didn’t know that at the time. But still though they had the germ of the idea was there and they’d done it very well. And within you know ten minutes it was obvious to me that all computers would work like this some day. It was obvious. I mean you could argue about how many years it would take. You could argue about who the winners and losers might be but you couldn’t argue about the inevitability. It was so obvious. You would have felt the same way had you been there.
這和保羅．艾倫說的一模一樣。
You know those are the exact words that Paul Allen used.
對啊。
Yeah.
真的很有意思。
It’s really interesting.
事情非常清楚。
It was obvious.
不過你去了兩次，你看到後帶了一些人回來。第二次發生了什麼事？他們澆了你冷水。
But there were two visits. You saw it and then you bought some people back with you. What happened the next time? They made you cool your heels for a while.
不是那樣的。
No.
不是嗎？艾黛兒．戈德堡不是這麼說的。
No? Well Adele Goldberg says otherwise.
什麼意思？
What do you mean?
第二次是她負責展示，她說她吵了三小時表示反對，期間他們帶你去參觀其他東西。
Well she did the demo when the group came back and she said that she argued against doing it for three hours and they took you other places and showed you other things while she was arguing.
你是說他們不願把東西給我們看。
OH you mean they were reluctant to show us the demo?
是她。
She was.
好吧，這我不知道，我不記得這件事了。我以為你說的是別的事。
Oh OK oh I have no idea. Yeah I don’t remember that. I thought you meant something else.
他們處理很有技巧。
So they were very skillful.
但他們還是給我們看了。給我們看是件好事，因為那些技術在全錄搞砸了。
But they did show us. And it’s good that they showed us because the technology crashed and burned at Xerox.
業務掛帥還是產品掛帥
怎麼說？
Why?
這一點我其實想了很多，之後和約翰．史卡利交手學會更多，我想我現在很清楚了。比方說史卡利是從百事可樂來的，他們頂多十年改一次產品，對他們來說換個瓶子就是新產品。假如你是做產品的人，你無法改變公司的營運方式。誰對百事可樂的成功有影響力？業務和行銷人員。所以升官的是他們，公司的營運由這些人掌控。這在百事可能沒問題，但同樣事情也可能發生在擁有獨佔性的科技公司，就像IBM和全錄。假如你是IBM或全錄的產品人員，你要做好的複製品還是好產品？有什麼差別呢？當你獨佔市場時，公司就不會再成功了。所以能讓公司更成功的人，是業務和行銷人員，最後變成他們經營公司，而產品人員被趕出決策圈，公司忘記做出好產品的重要性。當初是對產品的敏銳和創意，讓他們獨霸市場，卻因經營公司的人而消失殆盡。他們對產品好壞沒有概念，不懂將好構想變成好產品的工藝，他們也沒有真的幫顧客想，全錄就是這麼一回事。
Oh I actually thought a lot about that and I learned more about that with John Sculley later on and I think I understand it now pretty well. What happens is like with John Scully, John came from PepsiCo. And they at most would change their product once every ten years. I mean to them a new product was like a new size bottle. Right. so if you were a product person you couldn’t change the course of that company very much. So who influenced the success of PepsiCo? The sales and marketing people. Therefore they were the ones that got promoted and therefore they were the ones that ran the company. Well for PepsiCo that might have been OK but it turns out the same thing can happen in technology companies that get monopolies. Like IBM and Xerox. If you were a product person at IBM or Xerox so you make a better copy or a better computer. So what? When you have a monopoly market share the company is not any more successful. So the people that can make the company more successful are sales and marketing people and they end up running the companies and the product people get driven out of decision making forms. And the companies forget what it means to make great products. Sort of the product sensibility and the product genius that bought them to that monopolistic position gets rotted out by people running these companies who have no conception of a good product versus a bad product. They have no conception of the craftsmanship that’s required to take a good idea and turn it into a good product and they really have no feeling in their hearts usually about wanting to really help the customers. So that’s what happened at Xerox.
「碳粉頭」
帕羅奧多研究中心的人，常說主事者是「碳粉頭」，他們的確是。那些碳粉頭會來視察研究中心，卻搞不清楚自己看到了什麼。
The people at Xerox PARC used to call the people that ran Xerox toner heads. And they just had. The toner heads would come out to Xerox Park and they just had no clue about what they were seeing.
請告訴觀眾碳粉是什麼。
And for our audience toner is what?
碳粉是給影印機用的，就是工業用影印機的墨粉。
Oh toner is what you put into a copier. You know the toner that you add to an industrial copier.
那個黑色的東西。
The black stuff.
黑色的東西沒錯。基本上他們只懂影印機，完全不懂電腦能做什麼，所以他們在整個電腦業裡敗下陣來。全錄本來今日可以稱霸整個電腦業，發展成十倍大的公司，他們可以是IBM，成為90年代的IBM，或是90年代的微軟，無論如何這都已經過去了，已經不再重要了。
The black stuff yeah. Basically they were copier heads that just had no clue about a computer or what it could do and so they just grabbed defeat from the greatest victory in the computer industry. Xerox could have owned the entire computer industry today. Could have been a company ten times its size. Could have been IBM. Could have been the IBM of the 90s. could have been the Microsoft of the 90s. But anyway that’s all ancient history. It doesn’t really matter anymore.
誰來幫賈伯斯成功
這當然。你剛才提到IBM，IBM進入市場時，有對你在蘋果造成威脅嗎？
Sure. You mentioned IBM. When IBM entered the market was that a daunting thing for you at Apple?
當然有。蘋果當時市值十億美元，而IBM進入市場時，市值約高達3百多億美元。所以當然了，威脅很大。我們犯了非常大的錯誤，IBM第一個產品很差，非常糟，我們犯的錯誤是沒有意識到，許多人因為利益因素，都想幫助IBM改進產品。因此假如IBM單打獨鬥的話，他們早就垮了。但我覺得IBM最聰明的地方，是讓很多人因為他們的成功獲利，正是這一點救了他們一命。
Oh sure. I mean here was Apple you know a one billion dollar company and here was IBM at that time probably a 30 some odd billion dollar company entering the market. Sure it was. It was very scary. We made a very big mistake though. IBM’s first product was terrible. It was really bad. And we made the mistake of not realising that a lot of other people had a very strong vested interest in helping IBM make it better. So if it had just been up to IBM they would have crashed and burned but IBM did have I think a genius in their approach which was to have a lot of other people have a vested interest in their success. And that’s what saved them in the end.
造訪全錄帕拉阿圖研究中心後，你如何實現自己帶回來的願景？
And so you came back from Xerox PARC with a vision and how did you implement the vision?
我把我們最優秀的人集合起來，開始讓他們往這方面努力。問題是我們從惠普聘請了一堆人，他們不懂這一點，就是不懂。
Well I got our best people together and started to get them working on this. The problem was that we’d hired a bunch of people from Hewlett Packard and they didn’t get this idea. They didn’t get it.
15元或300元的滑鼠
我記得跟一些人大吵一架。他們認為最酷的用戶界面，是在螢幕底部加上軟鍵。他們沒有等比例間距字體的概念，也沒有滑鼠的概念。我確實記得與這些人爭論，他們對我大吼大叫，說滑鼠要花五年來設計，成本高達300美元。最後我受夠了，我就去外面找到大衛．凱利設計，要他給我設計一個滑鼠。90天內，就有了15塊成本的滑鼠，而且功能非常可靠。我發現蘋果某方面缺少這種人才，能多方位掌握這個想法，的確有一個核心團隊可以；但由惠普人馬組成的團隊卻不行。
I remember having dramatic arguments with some of these people who thought the coolest thing in user interface was soft keys at the bottom of a screen. They had no concept of proportionally spaced fonts. No concept of a mouse. As a matter of fact I remember arguing with these folks. People screaming at me that it would take us five years to engineer a mouse and it would cost $300 to build and I finally got fed up. I just went outside and found David Kelly Design and asked him to design me a mouse and in 90 days we had a mouse we could build for 15 bucks that was phenomenally reliable. I found that in a way Apple did not have the calibre of people that was necessary to seize this idea in many ways. And there was a core team that did but there was a larger team that mostly had come from Hewlett Packard that didn’t have a clue.
這就是專業性的話題，有其黑暗面和光明面，對吧？
There comes this issue of professionalism. There’s a dark side and a light side to it isn’t there?
不，你知道嗎？這無關光明黑暗，而是這讓員工困惑，公司也感到困惑。
No you know what it is? It’s not dark and light. It’s that people get confused. Companies get confused.
最好的人才最難管理
隨著公司規模越來越大，他們便想複製最初的成功。許多人認為當初成功的過程中，一定有其奇妙之處。於是他們開始嘗試予以制度化，不久人們便感到困惑，把程序制度當成實質內容，說到底這就是IBM失敗之處。IBM擁有最好的程序人員，他們只是忘了內容這件事。蘋果也有點這種狀況，我們有很多人很會管理程序，他們只是不懂內容。我體認到最好的人才真正懂內容，而他們是最難管理的人，但你不得不容忍他們，因為他們對內容很在行。這就是好產品的關鍵因素，不是程序，而是內容。我們在蘋果有點這種問題，最後導致Lisa的失敗，但它也有其成功之處，某種程度上它超越時代。但基本的內容理解不夠，蘋果背離初衷，一萬美元對那些惠普的人很便宜。對市場和經銷管道來說，一萬美元是天價。因此我們製造出完全不符合公司文化的產品，與公司形象不吻合，與經銷管道也不合，對我們當前客戶亦然，沒有人負擔得起這樣的產品，於是它失敗了。
When they start getting bigger they want to replicate their initial success. And a lot of them think well somehow there is some magic in the process of how that success was created so they start to try to institutionalise process across the company. And before very long people get very confused that the process is the content. And that’s ultimately the downfall of IBM. IBM has the best process people in the world. They just forgot about the content. And that’s what happened a little bit at Apple too. We had a lot of people that were great at management process. They just didn’t have a clue as to the content. And in my career I found that the best people you know are the ones that really understand the content and they’re a pain in the butt to manage. You know. But you put up with it because they are so great at the content. And that’s what makes great products. It’s not process. It’s content. So we had a little bit of that problem at Apple and that problem eventually resulted in the Lisa which had it’s moments of brilliance. In a way it was very far ahead of its time but there wasn’t enough fundamental content understanding. Apple drifted too far away from its roots. To these Hewlett Packard guys $10,000 was cheap. To our market, to our distribution channels $10,000 was impossible. So we produced a product that was a complete mismatch for the culture of our company. For the image of our company. For the distribution channels of our company. For our current customers. None of them could afford a product like that. And it failed.
結果你和約翰．考奇互爭領導權。
Now you and John Couch fought for leadership.
是啊，結果我輸了，沒錯。
Absolutely and I lost. That’s correct.
怎麼會這樣？
How did that come about?
我認為Lisa的問題很嚴重，它正朝我剛描述的厄運發展。我無法以此說服蘋果的高階主管，而我們的運作是以團隊為主，於是我輸了。
Well I thought Lisa was in serious trouble. I thought Lisa was going off in this very bad direction as I’ve just described. I could not convince enough people in the senior management of Apple that that was the case and we ran the place as a team for the most part. So I lost.
麥金塔引領蘋果復生
當時我低潮了幾個月，不久後我領悟到必須採取行動，因為Apple II就快過氣，我們必須趕快改進這項技術，否則蘋果可能會不復存在。於是我組織一個小團隊做麥金塔，我們肩負起拯救蘋果的使命，雖然沒有人想到這一點，但事實證明我們是對的。隨著麥金塔持續進化，顯然這也是改造蘋果的一種方式。我意思是我們改造了一切，我們改造製造過程，我參觀了日本約80座自動化工廠，然後在加州建立世界上第一座自動化電腦工廠，我們採用Lisa的68000微處理器，我們將價格談到Lisa的1/5，因為產量會大幅增加。我們真的開始設計售價1千美元的麥金塔，但最後沒有生產，我們可以賣2千美元，但最後售價落在美金2千5，我們整整花了4年做這件事。我們打造這項產品，我們建立自動化工廠，打造生產用的機器，我們建立了全新的經銷制度，建立了截然不同的行銷方式，我認為成果很不錯。
And at that point in time I brooded for a few months but it was not very long after that that it really occurred to me that if we didn’t do something here the Apple II was running out of gas and we needed to do something with this technology fast or else Apple might cease to exist as the company that it was. And so I formed a small team to do the Macintosh and we were on a mission from God to save Apple. No one else thought so but it turned out we were right. And as we evolved the Mac it became very clear that this was also a way of reinventing Apple. I mean we reinvented everything. We reinvented manufacturing. I visited probably 80 automated factories in Japan and we built the world’s first automated computer factory in the world in California here. So we adopted the 68000 microprocessor that Lisa had. We negotiated a price that was a fifth of what Lisa was going to pay for it because we were going to use it in much higher volume. And we really started to design this product that could be sold for $1000 called the Macintosh and we didn’t make it. We could have sold it at $2000 but we came out at 2500. And we spent four years of our life doing that. We built the product. We built the automated factory. The machine to build the machine. We built a completely new distribution system. We built a completely different marketing approach and I think it worked pretty well.
你激勵了這支團隊，你必須帶領他們。
You motivated this team. You had to guide them.
我們必須建立團隊。
We had to build the team.
建立團隊、激勵團隊、領導團隊、調整團隊。
Build the team. Motivate it. Guide them. Deal with them.
熱情、遠見、優先順序
我們採訪了麥金塔團隊不少人，最重要的總歸一句，是你的熱情、你的遠見。而你是如何訂定優先順序？開發產品對你來說什麼最重要？
We’ve interviewed lots of people from your Macintosh team and you know what it keeps coming down to is your passion, your vision and how do you order your priorities in there? What’s important to you in the development of a product?
我離開後對蘋果最傷的一件事，是史卡利犯了一個很嚴重的毛病。
One of the things that really hurt Apple was after I left John Sculley got a very serious disease and that disease,
光是棒想法不夠
這種毛病我也在別人身上見過。那就是認為只要有很棒的想法，事情就有了九成，假如你跟別人說有什麼好點子，當然他們會想辦法讓它成真，但這當中的問題是，有大量的工藝技術，存在於好想法與好產品之間。很棒的想法會隨著開發而改變，結果從來不會跟開始一樣，因為深入細節便會學到很多東西，你會發現自己必須權衡得失。好比電子有些事做不到，塑膠和玻璃也非無所不能，工廠和機器人生產也有極限。而一旦進入產品設計，就必須同時掌握千萬個想法，將這些想法融合在一起，持續努力找出嶄新的組合方式，以達成自己想要的成果。每天你都會發現新的東西，可能是新的問題或新的機會，可以讓東西有點不同的樣貌，這樣的過程才是關鍵所在。我們剛開始有許多很棒的想法，但我始終認為，一群人專心致志做事；就像我兒時鄰居一個喪偶的男人，當時他已經80幾歲，外表有點嚇人。之後我和他稍微有點認識，我想他可能會雇我來除草之類的。有一天他邀請我進入車庫，他說有東西想給我看，他拿出一個塵封的岩石磨光機，有皮帶連接馬達和金屬罐。他要我跟著他走，我們出去後院，找了一些石頭。
I’ve seen other people get it too, it’s the disease of thinking that a really great idea is 90% of the work and if you just tell all these other people you know here is this great idea then of course they can go off and make it happen. And the problem with that is that there is just a tremendous amount of craftsmanship in between a great idea and a great product. And as you evolve that great idea it changes and grows. It never comes out like it starts because you learn a lot more as you get into the subtleties of it and you also find there is tremendous trade offs that you have to make. There are just certain things you can’t make electrons do. there are certain things you can’t make plastic do or glass do or factories do or robots do. And as you get into all these things designing a product is keeping 5000 things in your brain, these concepts, and fitting them all together and continuing to push to fit them together in new and different ways to get what you want. And every day you discover something new that is a new problem or a new opportunity to fit these things together a little differently. And it’s that process that is the magic. And so we had a lot of great ideas when we started but what I’ve always felt that a team of people doing something they really believe in is like when I was a young kid there was a widowed man that lived up the street. And he was in his 80s. he was a little scary looking. And I got to know him a little bit. I think he might have paid me to mow his lawn or something. And one day he said come on into my garage I want to show you something. And he pulled out this dusty old rock tumbler. It was a motor and a coffee can and a little band between them. And he said come on with me. We went out to the back and we got some rocks.
摩擦、砥礪、噪音的結果
一些很普通、不起眼的石頭，然後把石頭放進罐裡，再加進一些液體和粗砂粉，把罐子蓋上後打開馬達。他要我明天再來，石頭在罐裡翻滾震耳欲聾。第二天我過去，打開罐子，看到的是拋光過美極了的石頭。本來只是尋常不過的石頭，經由互相摩擦、互相砥礪，發出些許噪音，結果變成美麗光滑的石頭。這件事我一直記在腦海裡。我常比喻為了理想奮鬥的團隊，便是集合一群才華洋溢的夥伴，讓他們互相碰撞、起爭執，有時甚至衝突，眾聲喧嘩。一起工作中，他們會互相砥礪，將想法磨得更晶亮，最後便得到那美麗的寶石。這實在很難解釋，但肯定不是一個人的成果。我的意思是人們喜歡典範，因此我成為某些事物的典範，但麥金塔其實是團隊的努力。我很早便在蘋果觀察到一件事，當時我不知道該如何解釋，但之後我反覆思考，發現大多數人生裡的事，普通者與頂尖者相比，相差頂多二比一。假如在紐約搭上一般司機的車，與最棒的司機來比，最棒的司機也許能讓你快30％時間到達目的地。普通和頂尖的汽車表現差異多少？也許20％吧。頂級和一般CD播放機的差別？我不知道，20%吧。因此2比1在人生中已是極大差異。就軟體來說，硬體也是。平庸和頂尖的差異，可能達50比1至100比1。
Some regular old ugly rocks. And we put them in the can with a little bit of liquid and a little bit of grit powder. We closed the can up and he turned this motor on and said come back tomorrow. And this can was making a racket as the stones went around. And I came back the next day and we opened the can and we took out these amazingly beautiful polished rocks. The same common stones that had gone on, through rubbing against each other like this, creating a little bit of friction, creating a little bit of noise, had come out these beautiful polished rocks. And that’s always been in my mind my metaphor for a team working really hard on something they’re passionate about is that it’s through the team through that group of incredibly talented people bumping up against each other, having arguments, having fights sometimes. Making some noise. And working together they polish each other and they polish the ideas. And what comes out are these really beautiful stones. It’s hard to explain and it’s certainly not the result of one person. I mean people like symbols so I’m the symbol of certain things. But it really was a team effort on the Mac. Now in my life I observed something fairly early on at Apple which I didn’t know how to explain it then but I’ve thought a lot about it since. Most things in life the dynamic range between average and the best is at most two to one. If you go to New York City and you get in an average taxicab driver versus the best taxicab driver you know you’re probably going to get to your destination with the best taxicab maybe 30% faster. In an automobile what’s the difference between average and the best? Maybe 20%. The best CD player and an average CD player. I don’t know. 20%. So two to one is a big dynamic range in most of life. In software, and it used to be the case in hardware too, the difference between average and the best is 50 to one maybe 100 to one.
成功在找到最好的人才
這種情況在生活中很少見，我很幸運有這樣的人生。我的成功建立在找到這些極具天賦的人才，我不屈就於次級人才，要就是最好的，因而收穫豐富。我發現當你聚集足夠的頂尖人才，雖然費盡千辛萬苦才找到五個，但他們真的喜歡與彼此共事，因為他們從來沒有這樣的機會。他們不想和次級的人共事，這變成一種自我約束的行為，他們只想聘請更多頂尖人才。所以你只要建立一小群頂尖人才，他們便會自行繁衍。麥金塔團隊便是這麼一回事，他們都是頂尖人才，他們都是才華洋溢的人才。
Very few things in life are like this but what I was lucky enough to spend my life in is like this. And so I’ve built a lot of my success off finding these truly gifted people and and not settling for B and C players but really going for the A players and I found something. I found that when you get enough a players together when you go through the incredible work to find five of these a players they really like working with each other because they’ve never had a chance to do that before. And they don’t want to work with B and C players. And so it becomes self policing and they only want to hire more A players and so you build up these pockets of a players and it propagates. And that’s what the Mac team was like. They were all A players. These were extraordinarily talented people.
但也正是這些人，表明他們再也無力為你效勞。
But they’re also people who now say that they don’t have the energy anymore to work for you.
確實如此。不過你若問麥金塔團隊成員，很多人會說他們不曾如此賣命過。有些會說那是他們最快樂的時光。不過所有人都會說，這肯定是他們人生中，最深刻也最珍貴的經驗。
Sure. Oh I think if you talk to a lot of people on the Mac team they will tell you it’s the hardest they’ve ever worked in their life. Some of them will tell you that it was the happiest they’ve ever been in their life. But I think all of them will tell you that is certainly one of the most intense and cherished experiences they will ever have in their life.
他們的確這樣說。
They did.
對某些人來說這些經驗不值。
Some of those things are not sustainable for some people.
當你說別人做得很爛，那是什麼意思？
What does it mean when you tell someone their work is shit?
通常就意味他們做得很爛。有時候是我覺得爛，但我錯了，但通常這表示他們做得不夠好。
It usually means their work is shit. Sometimes it means I think your work is shit and I’m wrong. But usually it means their work is not anywhere near good enough.
比爾．阿特金森曾說，他說當你說別人做得很爛時，真正意思其實是你不懂，請你解釋給我聽好嗎？
I had this great quote from Bill Atkinson who says when you say someone’s work is shit you really mean I don’t quite understand it would you please explain it to me?
不，我通常不是那種意思。假如你找到真的很棒的人才，他們知道自己真的很棒，你不需要呵護他們的自尊心。真正重要的是工作表現，這大家都知道，唯一重要的是工作表現。
No that’s not usually what I meant. When you get really good people they know they’re really good and you don’t have to baby people’s egos so much and what really matters is the work and everybody knows that.
坦白告訴他們作得不夠好
大家肩負處理特定難題的任務，這些頂尖人才備受信賴。你能為他們做的，就是做得不夠好時指點他們。話要說清楚，說明為什麼，好讓他們回到正軌，還要不能讓他們質疑你對他們能力的信心，但也不能有誤解的空間，他們的工作成果的確不夠好，不足以支持團隊的目標。這一點很難辦到，我一向採取很直接的方法。假如你去問跟我共事過的人，有真本事的人都覺得受益良多，也有些人的確很受不了我。我也是那種不在乎誰對的人，我只在乎成功。你會發現很多人都會告訴你，我是個堅持己見的人，有時他們提出相反的證據，5分鐘後我便完全改變主意，因為我就是這個樣子。我不在乎自己是錯的，我承認自己常常是錯的，那對我來說並不重要，要緊的是我們做對了。
That’s all that matters is the work. People are being counted on to do specific pieces of the puzzle and the most important thing I think you can do for somebody who is really good and who’s really being counted on is to point out to them when their work isn’t good enough. And to do it very clearly and to articulate why and to get them back on track. And you need to do that in a way that does not call into question your confidence in their abilities but leaves not too much room for interpretation that the work they have done for this particular thing is not good enough to support the goal of the team. And that’s a hard thing to do. And I’ve always taken a very direct approach. And I think if you talk to people that have worked with me the really good people have found it beneficial. Some people have hated it you know. And I’m also one of these people that I don’t really care about being right. I just care about success. You’ll find a lot of people that will tell you that I had a very strong opinion and they presented evidence to the contrary and five minutes later I completely changed my mind because I’m like that. I don’t mind being wrong. I’ll admit that I’m wrong a lot. Doesn’t really matter to me too much. What matters to me is that we do the right thing.
蘋果因何投入桌面出版的領域，並變成麥金塔的殺手級應用？
So how and why did Apple get into desktop publishing which would become the Mac’s killer app?
我不知道你是否知道，美國第一台佳能雷射印表機引擎，便是送到蘋果公司。我們把它接上Lisa，早在別人之前便開始成像列印，比惠普還早，早得很，也比奧多比還早。不過我聽到有一些人，離開全錄帕羅奧多研究中心，在車庫裡創業。於是我去看他們在做什麼，他們做的比我們還好，而他們想成為硬體公司，他們想製造印表機等產品，於是我說服他們成為軟體公司。
I don’t know if you know this but we got the first Canon laser printer engine shipped in the United States at Apple and we had it hooked up to a Lisa actually imaging pages before anybody. Before HP. Long before HP. Long before Adobe. But I heard a few times people would tell me hey there are these guys over in this garage that left Xerox PARC. You ought to go see them. And I finally went and saw them and I saw what they were doing and it was better than what we were doing and they were going to be a hardware company. They wanted to make printers and the whole thing. And so I talked them into being a software company.
蘋果創造出桌上出版巿埸
兩到三週內，我們便取消自己的內部計畫。一堆人都想殺了我，但我們做到了，我和奧多比談妥使用他們的軟體。蘋果買下他們19.9％股份，他們需要資金，我們想要一點主導權，我們就此大展身手。於是我們從佳能取得引擎，第一台雷射印表機控制器，就是在蘋果設計出來的。我們從奧多比取得軟體，並引進雷射印表機，當時公司裡沒有人想做，除了我們幾個麥金塔的成員。大家都覺得，7千美金的印表機太誇張。他們不明白的是，你可以透過AppleTalk分享。他們理智上可以理解，內心卻無法認同，因為我們上一次推的高價產品就是Lisa。我們開始推動這項產品，我因而必須排除反對者，但最後還是成功了，它成為市場上第一台雷射印表機，之後的事情便是歷史了。我離開蘋果時，它是全球營收第一的印表機公司，不幸地在我離開三、四年後，龍頭寶座拱手讓給惠普。但我離開時，它是全球最大的印表機公司。
Within two or three weeks we had cancelled our internal project, and a bunch of people wanted to kill me over this, but we did it. And I had cut a deal with Adobe to use their software and we bought 19.9% of Adobe at Apple. They needed some financing. We wanted a little bit of control. And we were off to the races and so we got the engines from Canon. We designed the first laser printer controller at Apple. And we got the software from Adobe and we introduced the laser writer and no one at the company wanted to do it but a few of us in the Mac group. Everybody thought a $7000 printer was crazy. What they didn’t understand was you could share it with AppleTalk. I mean they understood it intellectually but they didn’t understand it viscerally because the last really expensive thing we tried to sell was Lisa. So we pushed this thing through and I had to basically do it over a few dead bodies but we pushed this thing through and it was the first laser printer on the market as you know and you know the rest is history. When I left Apple, Apple was the largest printer company measured by revenue in the world. It lost that distinction to Hewlett Packard about three or four years after I left unfortunately. But when I left it was the largest printer company in the world.
你有設想過桌面出版嗎？還是那根本不必想？
Did you envision desktop publishing? Was that a no brainer?
有啊，但我們還想到真正的網路化辦公室。因此1995年1月開年度會議並介紹新產品時，我可能犯下職業生涯中，最大的行銷錯誤。
Yes but we also envisioned really a networked office. And so in January of 1995 when we had our annual meeting and introduced our new products I made probably the largest marketing blunder of my career.
是1985嗎？
1985?
抱歉，是1985。我犯下職涯中最大的行銷錯誤，我宣布了麥金塔辦公室，而不是只有桌面出版。桌面出版是其中重要一環，但同時也宣布了一堆其他東西。當時應該聚焦在桌面出版就好。
1985 sorry. I made probably the largest marketing blunder of my career by announcing the Macintosh Office instead of just desktop publishing. And we had desktop publishing as a major component of that but we announced a bunch of other stuff as well and I think we should have just focused on desktop publishing at that time.
史卡利創傷
因為與蘋果執行長史卡利不合，賈伯斯於1985年離開公司。
After serious disagreements with Apple CEO John Sculley Steve left the company in 1985.
談談離開蘋果的經過好嗎？
Tell us about your departure from Apple.
哦，非常難過。我也不曉得想不想談。我能說什麼？我用錯人了。
Oh it was very painful. I’m not even sure I want to talk about it. What can I say? I hired the wrong guy.
你是說史卡利。
That was Sculley.
對，他毀了我花十年打造的一切，我首當其衝，但這還不是最慘的。我會很高興地離開蘋果，假如蘋果能照我的意願發展，基本上他搭上了要升空的火箭，火箭升空了卻沖昏了他的頭。他搞錯了，以為火箭是他造的，因此他改變了航道，最後難以避免墜落地面。
Yes. And he destroyed everything I’d spent ten years working for. Starting with me but that wasn’t the saddest part. I would have gladly left Apple if Apple would have turned out like I wanted to. He basically got on a rocket ship that was about to leave the pad and the rocket ship left the pad and it went to his head. He got confused and thought that he built the rocket ship. And then he kind of changed the trajectory so that it was inevitably going to crash into the ground.
面對逆境的試錬
麥金塔之前和麥金塔初期，一直都是你們倆共同掌權，你們倆形影不離。
The pre-Macintosh days and the early Macintosh days it was always the Steve and John show. You two were joined at the hip for a while there.
沒錯。
That’s right.
之後某些事情使你們決裂。
And then something happened to split you.
你說得對。
That’s correct.
那是什麼事情？
What was that?
這一行從1984年底開始衰退，銷售量嚴重縮水。約翰不曉得該怎麼辦，他毫無頭緒，蘋果的高層出現了領導真空。各部門都有很強的總經理，我負責麥金塔部門，Apple II有別人負責，有些部門出現了一些問題，負責儲存部門的人完全失職，還有一堆亟需改變的事情，但這些問題都被擱置了。因為市場在萎縮，而領導人沒有作為，約翰的表現董事會並不滿意，他在公司可能待不久了。在那之前我沒看出來的是，約翰有極為驚人的求生本能。有人告訴過我，沒這種本能，當不到百事可樂的總裁，這是真的。約翰決定把問題歸咎於一人身上，最佳人選就是我，我們於是失和，而約翰與董事會關係非常密切，他們相信了他，事情就是這樣子。
Well what happened was that the industry went into a recession in late 1984. Sales started seriously contracting. And John didn’t know what to do. He had not a clue. And there was a leadership vacuum at the top of Apple. There were fairly strong general managers running the divisions. I was running the Macintosh division. Somebody else was running the Apple Two division etc. There were some problems with some of the divisions. There was a person running the storage division that was completely out to lunch and a bunch of things that needed to be changed. But all of those problems got put in a pressure cooker because of this contraction in the marketplace. And there was no leadership. And John was in a situation where the board was not happy and where he was probably not long for the company. And one thing I did not ever see about John until that time was he had an incredible survival instinct. Somebody once told me this guy didn’t get to be the President of PepsiCo without these kinds of instincts and it was true. And John decided that a really good person to be the root of all these problems would be me. And so we came to loggerheads. And John had cultivated a very close relationship with the board. And they believed him. So that’s what happened.
所以公司裡有發展願景的爭執。
So there were competing visions for the company.
很明顯，但也說不上是發展願景的爭執。我不認為約翰有公司發展願景。
Oh clearly. Well not so much competing visions for the company because I don’t think John had a vision for the company.
我猜我想問的是，你不受青睞的願景為何？
I guess I’m asking what was your vision that lost out in this instance.
這不是發展願景的問題，而是執行的問題。我相信蘋果需要更強勢的領導，統整各部門間的派別，麥金塔是蘋果的未來。我們需要大幅縮減Apple II的開支，花大錢在麥金塔這一塊上，諸如此類的事情。約翰只想要繼續當公司的執行長，任何手段都是可以接受的。
It wasn’t an issue of vision it was an issue of execution. In the sense that my belief was that Apple needed much stronger leadership to sort of unite these various factions that we’d created with the divisions. That the Macintosh was the future of Apple. That we needed to rein back expenses dramatically in the Apple II area. That we needed to be spending very heavily in the Macintosh area. Things like that. And John’s vision was that he should remain the CEO of the company. And anything that would help him do that would be acceptable.
「他們清楚告訴我不需要我了」
蘋果在1985年初處於癱瘓狀態，我在當時無力經營整個公司，你知道我當時30歲，經驗不足以經營20億美元的公司。不幸的是，約翰也沒有。他們清楚告訴我不需要我了，真的很淒慘。
I think that Apple was in a state of paralysis in the early part of 1985 and I wasn’t at that time capable, I don’t think, of running the company as a whole. You know I was 30 years old and I don’t think I had enough experience to run a two billion dollar company. Unfortunately John didn’t either. I was told in no uncertain terms there was no job for me. That was really tragic.
被放逐冷凍。
Siberia.
蘋果聰明的話應該讓我做下去。我自告奮勇，何不讓我成立研究部門？你知道的，一年給我幾百萬，我會請來一些很傑出的人才，我們會做出很棒的東西。他們跟我說不可能，我連辦公室都沒了，再繼續談下去就傷感了。但那無關緊要，我只有一個人，公司的人比我多得多，所以那並不重要。重要的是在接下來幾年內，蘋果的價值被全盤破壞了。
Yeah it would have been far smarter for Apple to sort of let me work on the next. I volunteered. Why don’t I start a research division? And you know give me a few million bucks a year and I’ll go hire some really great people and we’ll do the next great thing. And I was told there was no opportunity to do that. My office was taken away. I mean I’ll get real emotional if we keep talking about this. But that’s irrelevant. I’m just one person and the company was a lot more people than me so that’s not the important part. The important part was the values of Apple over the next several years were systematically destroyed.
當時蘋果領先十年，但就此停滯不前
我接著問他對蘋果現況的看法。別忘了訪問在1995年，一年後他將重返蘋果，也別忘了一年後蘋果買下NeXT時，他立即出售交易所得的蘋果股票。
I then asked Steve for his thoughts on the state of Apple. Remember this was 1995. A year before he would go back to Apple. Remember too that when Apple bought NeXT a year after this interview Steve immediately sold the Apple stock he received as part of the sale.
蘋果如今正逐漸死去，而且是非常痛苦的死法，一路下滑直到結束。原因是因為當我離開蘋果時，我們領先整個業界十年，麥金塔超前10年，我們看到微軟花了十年才趕上，他們能趕上是因為蘋果停滯不前。現今的麥金塔跟我離開時，只有25％的不同，他們一年花數億美金在研發上，總共差不多有50億美元，然後得到了什麼？我不知道。
Apple is dying today. Apple is dying a very painful death. It’s on a glide slope to die. And the reason is because when I walked out the door at Apple we had a ten year lead on everybody else in the industry. Macintosh was ten years ahead. We watched Microsoft take ten years to catch up with it. Well the reason they could catch up with it was because Apple stood still. I mean the Macintosh that’s shipping today is like 25% different than the day I left. They’ve spent hundreds of millions of dollars a year on R&D. I mean you know a total of probably five billion dollars on R&D. What did they get for it? I don’t know.
空有高手，沒人領導
問題在於繼續進步，創造新產品的知識消失了，我想還是有很多高手留了下來，但他們沒有機會齊力合作，因為沒有人領導他們。現在的蘋果許多方面都落後了，市場佔有率是如此，最重要的是產品差異化，已經被微軟蠶食瓜分。他們現在有的是現有用戶數量，但不僅沒增長還慢慢萎縮，雖然幾年間能提供不錯的收入，但會逐漸下滑，然後觸底。這真的很不幸，我不認為目前有辦法逆轉。
What happened was the understanding of how to move these things forward and how to create these new products somehow evaporated. And I think a lot of the good people stuck around for a while but there wasn’t an opportunity to get together and do this because there wasn’t any leadership to do that. What’s happened with Apple now is they’ve fallen behind in many respects, certainly in market share, and most importantly their differentiation has been eroded by Microsoft. And so what they have now is they have their installed base which is not growing but which is shrinking slowly but will provide a good revenue stream for several years but it’s a glide slope that’s just going to go like this. It’s unfortunate and I don’t really think it’s reversible at this point in time.
我也不覺得。那麼微軟呢？他們是現在的龍頭，就像是進入未來的福特汽車，絕對不是凱迪拉克，也不是寶馬。這是怎麼回事呢？他們是如何辦到的？
Neither do I. What about Microsoft? That’s the juggernaut now. And it’s a kind of Ford LTD going into the future. It’s definitely not a Cadillac. It’s not a BMW. What’s going on there? How did those guys do that?
微軟的崛起，歸功於名為IBM的推動火箭。我知道這樣說比爾會生氣，但這當然是真的。
Microsoft’s orbit was made possible by a Saturn V booster called IBM. And I know Bill would get upset with me for saying this but of course it was true.
微軟因蘋果稱霸應用軟體
由於比爾和微軟的努力，他們掌握此絕佳機會，為自己創造更多的機會。大多數人不記得了，但直到1984年與麥金塔開始，微軟之前沒應用程式的經驗。當時市場由蓮花主導，微軟賭了一把為麥金塔寫程式，但他們寫得很糟，不過他們堅持下去，不斷改進，最後稱霸麥金塔的應用程式市場，然後利用Windows的跳板，用相同的應用程式進入PC市場。現在他們也主宰了PC領域，所以他們有兩項特點。
And much to Bill and Microsoft’s credit they used that fantastic opportunity to create more opportunity for themselves. Most people don’t remember but until 1984 with the Mac, Microsoft was not in the applications business. It was dominated by Lotus. And Microsoft took a big gamble to write for the Mac and they came out with applications that were terrible. But they kept at it and they made them better and eventually they dominated the Macintosh application market and then used a springboard of Windows to get into the PC market with those same applications and now they dominate the applications in the PC space too. So they have two characteristics.
鍥而不捨但沒品味的機會主義者
我認為他們是厲害的機會主義者，這沒有不好的意思；其次他們和日本人一樣鍥而不捨，他們現在可以這樣，是因為從IBM那裡來的收入。但無論如何他們很努力，這一點不得不佩服他們。微軟唯一的問題是沒有品味。他們完全沒有品味，這意思是…我不是隨便說說，我是很認真的。他們不在乎原創，他們的產品沒有文化成份。你說這有什麼重要性？等比例間距字體來自排版和精美的書籍，這就是創意的來源。如果沒有麥金塔，他們產品裡不會有那樣東西。所以我難過的不是微軟的成功，他們的成功我沒有意見，他們的成功大多是自己的努力。我有意見的是，他們只做三流的產品，他們的產品沒有靈魂，他們的產品沒有神采，都非常的無趣。可悲的是大多數客戶也是如此，但人類要進步的話，就要把最好的東西散播開來，讓大家成長中有好的養分，並能瞭解好東西的微妙之處。微軟與麥當勞為伍，這一點讓我感到難過。難過的不是微軟贏了，而是微軟產品沒有洞見和創意。
I think they’re very strong opportunists. And I don’t mean that in a bad way. And two, they’re like the Japanese they just keep on coming. Now they were able to do that because of the revenue stream from the IBM deal. But nonetheless they made the most of it and I give them a lot of credit for that. The only problem with Microsoft is they just have no taste. They have absolutely no taste and what that means is, I don’t mean that in a small way, I mean that in a big way. In the sense that they don’t think of original ideas and they don’t bring much culture into their product. And you say well why is that important? Well proportionally spaced fonts come from typesetting and beautiful books. That’s where one gets the idea. If it weren’t for the Mac they would never have that in their products. And so I guess I am saddened, not by Microsoft’s success, I have no problem with their success, they’ve earned their success for the most part. I have a problem with the fact that they just make really third rate products. Their products have no spirit to them. Their products have no spirit of enlightenment about them. They are very pedestrian and the sad part is that most customers don’t have a lot of that spirit either but the way that we’re going to ratchet up our species is to take the best and to spread it around to everybody so that everybody grows up with better things and starts to understand the subtlety of these better things. And Microsoft it’s McDonalds so that’s what saddens me. not that Microsoft has won but that Microsoft’s products don’t display more insight and more creativity.
那麼你有什麼打算？談談NeXT的事吧。
What are you doing about it? Tell us about NeXT.
我不打算怎麼辦，因為NeXT小的無能為力，我只能在旁邊看，我事實上根本幫不上忙。
I’m not doing anything about it. Because NeXT is too small of a company to do anything about that. I’m just watching it. And there is really nothing I can do about it.
接著我們談到NeXT。史帝夫1995年時經營的公司，不久即將被蘋果買下。NeXT軟體會以OS X的形式，成為麥金塔的核心。
Next we talked about NeXT, the company Steve was running in 1995 which Apple was soon to buy. Next software would become the heart of the Mac in the form of OS X.
你其實不想談NeXT吧？
You don’t really want to hear about NeXT do you?
我想。
Yes I do.
你想，很好。也好，因為我沒有太多時間。今天沒辦法跟你說NeXT是什麼。
You do. OK. Well maybe the best thing is because I don’t have much time is to tell you what NeXT is today.
沒關係。
That’s fine.
顯然當今的電腦產業，創新發生在軟體上，而軟體開發並無重大革新。這一行的創新在軟體上，而軟體開發20年來了無心意，過去20年裡是這樣的。
Clearly the innovation in the computer industry is happening in software right now and there hasn’t been a revolution in how we create software. The innovation in the industry is in software and there hasn’t ever been a real revolution in how we created software certainly not in the last 20 years.
軟體是最有力的競爭武器
事實上每況愈下。麥金塔對使用者來說是一種革新，讓操作變得更加容易，對開發商而言卻剛好相反。開發商得付出代價，寫軟體變得複雜多了，因為要讓用戶使用便利。軟體目前無所不在，軟體是最有力的商業競爭武器。最成功的商戰便是「親友計畫」，MCI電話公司的「親友優待計畫」，十年來最棒點子。那是什麼呢？那是個絕妙的主意，客製計費軟體。AT&T整整18個月沒有回應，數十億美元的市場拱手讓給MCI。這並不是因為他們笨，而是他們寫不出計費軟體。因此在各種層面上，軟體在這個世界擁有很大的力量，可以提供新產品和服務給人們。無論是透過網際網路或其他管道，軟體會成為社會的主要推動力。
Matter of fact it’s gotten worse. While the Macintosh was a revolution for the end user to make it easier to use it was the opposite for the developer. The developer paid the price and software got much more complicated to write as it became easier to use for the end user. Software is infiltrating everything we do these days. In businesses software is one of the most potent competitive weapons. I mean the most successful business war was Friends and Family. MCI Friends and Family. In the last ten years. And what was that? It was a brilliant idea and it was custom billing software. AT&T didn’t respond for 18 months yielding billions of dollars worth of market share to MCI not because they were stupid but they couldn’t get the billing software done. So in ways like that and smaller ways software is becoming an incredible force in this world. To provide new goods and services to people whether it’s over the internet or what have you. Software is going to be a major enabler in our society.
物件導向軟體改變軟體的產出
我們採用了1979年時，我在全錄帕羅奧多研究中心看到卻不瞭解的原創概念，即物件導向技術。我們改進這種技術並商品化，成為市場上最大的供應商。這種技術可以用十倍速度建立軟體，而且做得更好，這就是我們在做的事。我們已經有中小型企業的規模，而我們是物件的最大供應商。我們市值約5千至7千5百萬美元，員工約300人，這就是NeXT。
We have taken another one of those brilliant original ideas at Xerox PARC that I saw in 1979 but didn’t see really clearly then called object oriented technology. And we have perfected it and commercialised it here and become the biggest supplier of it to the market. And this object technology lets you build software ten times faster and is better. And so that’s what we do. And we’ve got a small to medium sized business and we’re the largest supplier of objects. We’re a 50 to 75 million dollar company. Got about 300 people and that’s what we do.
節目最後，我們要展望未來。這是第4頻道的要求。那麼今後十年內，你對這項技術有什麼願景？
The end of the third show is the one moment where we do look into the future as Channel 4 has asked us to do that and so what’s your vision of ten years from now with this technology that you’re developing?
我覺得是網際網路。當今軟體和電腦領域裡，有兩件事相當令人興奮。一個是物件，另一個就是網路。網路非常令人興奮，因為它實現了我們許多夢想。電腦終將不只是計算機，而會蛻變成通信的裝置。
Well you know I think the Internet and the Web. There are two exciting things happening in software and in computing today. One is objects but the other one is the Web. The Web is incredibly exciting because it is the fulfilment of a lot of our dreams that the computer would ultimately not be primarily a device for computation but metamorphose into a device for communication.
網際網路：決定性的創新科技
網路則讓這一切成真。其次令人興奮的原因，是因為微軟並不擁有它，所以有大量的創新正在發生，因此網路會對社會產生深刻影響。美國約15％的商品和服務都通過型錄或電視銷售，這些都會轉移到網路上去，這是數十億美元的商機，不久後上百億的商品和服務都將透過網路銷售，可以把它看作最終極的直銷管道。另一方面，不管規模多小的公司，在網路上也有跟大公司一樣的份量。因此，我認為十年後回顧現在，網路必將成為決定性的技術，也是電腦具有社交性的轉捩點，我覺得這很有發展性。它為個人電腦注入新生命力，我覺得一定會很厲害。
And with the web that’s finally happening. And secondly it’s exciting because Microsoft doesn’t own it and therefore there’s a tremendous amount of innovation happening. So I think the web is going to be profound in what it does to our society. As you know about 15% of the goods and services in the US are sold via catalogues or over television. All that is going to go on the web and more. Billions and billions. Soon tens of billions of dollars worth of goods and services are going to be sold on the web. A way to think about it is that it is the ultimate direct to customer distribution channel. Another way to think about it is the smallest company in the world can look as large as the largest company in the world on the web. So I think the web, as we look back ten years from now, the web is going to be the defining technology. The defining social moment for computing. And I think it’s going to be huge. I think it’s breathed a whole new generation of life into personal computing. And I think it’s going to be huge. Yeah.
而你的產品是軟體。
And you’re making software.
的確，但大家不都是這樣。別管我們在做什麼，網路將為這一行打開全新門路。
Oh absolutely but so is everybody. Forget about what we’re doing. Just as an industry the web is going to open a whole new door to this industry.
這種事情一旦發生看似理所當然，但五年前誰能猜得到？
And it’s another one of those things that it’s obvious once it happens but five years ago who would have guessed?
是的，沒錯。我們這個世界真是奇妙
Right. That’s right. Isn’t this a wonderful place we live in.
我們創造工具、強化天賦
我很想知道什麼驅使著史帝夫？
I was keen to know about Steve’s passion. What drove him?
我小時在《科學人》讀到一篇文章，測量地球上各物種的運動效率，有熊、黑猩猩、浣熊、鳥類和魚類，牠們每公里花多少大卡移動？人類也接受了測定，結果由兀鷲勝出。牠是最有效率的物種，而萬物之靈的人類，表現不怎麼起眼，排名只到前1/3左右。不過有人很聰明，懂得測量人類騎自行車的效率，這讓兀鷲甘拜下風，稱霸整個排行榜。我記得這件事對我影響很大。我牢記人類是工具的建造者，我們所建造的工具，可大幅增強我們天生的能力。早年在蘋果真的有這樣的廣告，說個人電腦是心靈的自行車。我衷心相信，在人類所有的發明中，電腦的排名一定高高在上，日後看來必定如此，它是我們發明過最棒的工具。我覺得自己很幸運能躬逢其盛，能在矽谷親眼目睹它的成形。
I read an article when I was very young in Scientific American and it measured the efficiency of locomotion for various species on the planet. So for bears and chimpanzees and racoons and birds and fish. How many kilocalories per kilometre did they spend to move? And humans were measured too. And the condor won. It was the most efficient. And mankind, the crown of creation, came in with a rather unimpressive showing about a third of the way down the list. But somebody there had the brilliance to test a human riding a bicycle. Blew away the condor. All the way off the charts. And I remember this really had an impact on me. I really remember this that humans are tool builders and we build tools that can dramatically amplify our innate human abilities. And to me we actually ran an ad like this in the early days at Apple the personal computer was the bicycle of the mind and I believe that with every bone in my body that of all the inventions of humans the computer is going to rank near, if not, at the top as history unfolds and we look back. And it is the most awesome tool that we have ever invented and I feel incredibly lucky to be at exactly the right place in Silicon Valley at exactly the right time historically where this invention has taken form.
品味決定方向
太空旅行中失之毫釐差之千里，出發時若能稍微調整航向，到了太空中便有極大差別。我覺得我們仍在航道的開始處。假如能夠朝正確方向調整，它會發展成更好的東西。我們有機會做了幾次調整，這帶給所有相關的人極大滿足。
And as you know when you set a vector off in space if you can change its direction a little bit at the beginning it’s dramatic when it gets a few miles out in space. I feel we are still really at the beginning of that vector. And if we can nudge it in the right directions it will be a much better thing as it progresses on. And I think we’ve had a chance to do that a few times and it brings all of us associated with it tremendous satisfaction.
但你怎麼知道什麼是正確方向？
But how do you know what’s the right direction?
終究可以總歸為品味。這是品味的問題。重點是讓自己接觸人間精華，然後引入你自己做的事情裡。我的意思是，畢卡索曾說過：「好的藝術家懂得複製，偉大的藝術家則擅長偷竊。」而我們不羞於竊取偉大的想法。
Ultimately it comes down to taste. It comes down to taste. It comes down to trying to expose yourself to the best things that humans have done and then try to bring those things into what you are doing. I mean Picasso had a saying. He said “Good artists copy, great artists steal.” And we have always been shameless about stealing great ideas.
人文改造電腦
我覺得麥金塔成功的原因，在於其創造者是音樂家、詩人、藝術家、動物學家和歷史學家，他們正好也是全球最棒的電腦科學家。如果沒投身電腦科學，他們在其他領域都會有傑出成就，而我們都為電腦帶來了人文氣息。這種人文的態度讓我們從其他領域引進我們看到的優點，眼光狹隘是不可能做到的。
And I think part of what made the Macintosh great was that the people working on it were musicians and poets and artists and zoologists and historians who also happened to be the best computer scientists in the world. But if it hadn’t been for computer science these people would have all been doing amazing things in life in other fields. And they brought with them, we all bought to this effort, a very liberal arts air. A very liberal arts attitude that we wanted to pull in the best that we saw in these other fields into this field. And I don’t think you get that if you’re very narrow.
節目中我一定會問這個問題：你是嬉皮還是書呆子？
One of the questions I asked everyone in the series was are you a hippy or a nerd?
如果不得不選擇，我很顯然是嬉皮。
Oh if I had to pick one of those two I’m clearly a hippy. Yeah.
你馬上就回答了。
In 30 seconds.
與我共事的人都是嬉皮。
All the people I work with are hippies too.
當真？為什麼？你特意找嬉皮或他們被你吸引？
Really? Why? Do you seek out hippies or are they attracted to you?
什麼叫做嬉皮？這是個含義豐富的老詞，對我而言這代表60至70年代初期，我們必須記住這一點，那是我成長的年代。所以我見證了許多事情，很多就發生在我們這裡。對我來說最精采的是有些事不是每天都會出現，生命裡的特殊體驗正在發生。不僅僅是工作和成家立業，還有其他更多的東西。人生有人們不常談到的一面，人生出現空檔我們才會體驗到，當時一切都顯得混亂，彷彿出現了大洞，應接不暇時你才會有此體驗。歷來許多人都在找人生答案，無論是梭羅或印度的神秘主義者，而嬉皮運動有那麼一點味道，想搞清楚到底怎麼回事。人生並非走父母的老路，當然最後的發展太過極端，但還是有些思想因此萌芽。有人會想當詩人，而非銀行家，我覺得這是件美妙的事情。我想把同樣的精神放進產品裡，這些產品出來後到人們的手上，他們便能感受到這種精神。使用麥金塔的人都會愛上它，而你很少聽到人們會愛上商品。這一點你知道的，但你能感覺到它的存在，裡頭有著某種奇妙的精神。
Well ask yourself what is a hippy. I mean this is an old word that has a lot of connotations but to me, remember the 60s happened in the early 70s right, so we have to remember that and that’s sort of when I came of age so I saw a lot of this. A lot of it happened right in our backyard here. To me the spark of that was that there was something beyond sort of what you see every day. There is something going on here in life beyond just a job, and a family and two cars in the garage, and a career, there is something more going on. There is another side of the coin that we don’t talk about much and we experience it when there’s gaps. When everything is not ordered and perfect. When there is kind of a gap. You experience this in rush of something. And a lot of people have said throughout history find out what that was. Whether it’s Thoreau or it’s Indian mystics or whoever it might be and the hippy movement got a little bit of that and they wanted to find out what that was about. And that life wasn’t about what they saw their parents doing. And of course the pendulum swung too far the other way and it was crazy but there was a germ of something there. And it’s the same thing that causes people to want to be poets instead of bankers. And I think that’s a wonderful thing and I think that that same spirit can be put into products and those products can be manufactured and given to people and they can sense that spirit. I mean if you talk to people that use the Macintosh they love it. You don’t hear people loving products very often. You know really. But you could feel it in there. There was something really wonderful there.
用電腦傳遞、共享特殊的感覺
與我共事過的頂尖人才，大部分都不是因為電腦才入行。他們進電腦這一行是因為，這是最能傳遞感覺的媒介，因為你想要與他人共享，這一點你懂嗎？
I don’t think that most of the really best people that I’ve worked with have worked with computers for the sake of working with computers. They’ve worked with computers because they are the medium that is best capable of transmitting some feeling that you have. That you want to share with other people. Does that make any sense to you?
懂啊。
Oh yes.
你知道在發明這些東西之前，這些人會去做其他事情。但電腦發明之後，人才匯聚，他們都是在學或之前便感到興趣，並認為這是可供發揮的媒介。
And you know before they invented these things all these people would have done other things. But computers were invented and they did come along and all these people did get interested in school or before school and said hey this is the medium that I think I can say something in.
1996年，受訪一年後，賈伯斯將NeXT售給蘋果公司。他再度掌握老公司的控制權，而公司距離破產只剩90天。隨之而來的是企業再生，在美國商業史上無人能及，一連串的創新產品，如iMac、iPod、iTunes、iPhone、iPad和蘋果商店，讓瀕臨破產的蘋果，成為全美最具價值的公司。一如他在本次專訪中所言，他把最好的東西散播蔓延出去，讓大家有更好的東西藉以成長。
In 1996, a year after this interview, Steve Jobs sold NeXT to Apple. He then took control of his old company at a time when it was 90 days from bankruptcy. What followed was a corporate renaissance unparalleled in American business history. With innovative products like iMac, iPod, iTunes, iPhone, iPad and Apple Stores Jobs turned an almost bankrupt Apple into the most valuable company in America. As he said in this interview, he took the best and spread it around “so that everybody grows up with better things”
“史帝夫．賈伯斯，1955-2011”
Steve Jobs 1955-2011